

COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION  
OF THE  
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY ORGANIZATION

AFTERNOON MEETING OF JUNE 30, 1948

Present: Messrs. Eberstadt, Allen, Baldwin, Cowles, Knowlson, McCloy, Patterson and Ward; Anderson, Embick, Hasbrouck, Mrs. Hobby (2:20 P.M.), and Truman-Smith; Connery, Fairman, Jenks, Miles, Sutherland and Willett.  
(Mr. McCloy left the meeting at 3:00 P.M.)

1. (2:00 P.M.) - Mr. Allen W. Dulles

Mr. Dulles stated that three months ago the President, through Mr. Souers, asked Messrs. Correa, Jackson and Dulles (Chairman) to make an investigation of CIA and related intelligence organizations with a view to making recommendations for their improvement. In order to avoid political implications, the end of 1948 was set as the approximate date by which a report should be rendered, although it was agreed that intermediate suggestions would be made in cases where it might seem desirable to take action before that time. Mr. Dulles stated that <sup>much of</sup> the actual investigation work is being done by a <sup>full-time</sup> small staff of four people who are making a thorough on-the-spot investigation. Two preliminary reports have already been made. There has been no official announcement of the appointment of the Committee, although some columnists and radio commentators have mentioned it.

Mr. Dulles feels that there will be certain differences between his approach to the problem and ours. ~~He feels that the effectiveness of intelligence depends on persons rather than upon organizational blueprints.~~ <sup>The</sup> group is investigating all branches of the CIA as well as the intelligence agencies of the State Department and the military services.

*Since his group will be expected to deal not only with the CIA but also with the framework of the executive branch.*

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From 80 to 90% of intelligence is collected by overt means (generally available public sources of information) and from 10 to 20% is collected by covert (secret) methods. The collection of intelligence depends more on men than on the technical set-up. The set-up provided under the <sup>national</sup> Security Act of 1947 provides <sup>a</sup> fairly adequate framework.- it is a great step forward in the intelligence set-up of the government.

Mr. Dulles then discussed in some detail the mechanics of handling intelligence. He feels that the present system of processing intelligence <sup>in C.I.A.</sup> is unsatisfactory due to the lack of adequate men for the job. The problem of getting them is a very difficult one but there is no reason why it cannot be corrected within the framework of the present Act. Really top men with breadth of viewpoint are required. Those now engaged in processing intelligence are somewhat young and somewhat inexperienced. Intelligence has <sup>long</sup> been ~~somehow~~ of a stepchild in our government organization in the past. It has not proved possible to get from the old line service agencies the men needed for a central appraisal group. Central appraisal <sup>of</sup> intelligence can be divided into two fields, spot dynamic and overall national estimates.

Spot dynamic appraisal (where there is no time for weighty consideration) needs top handling. Few men can fill the job adequately but it is a highly essential one. The prestige of the intelligence agency needs building up if the required personnel is to be obtained.

It is highly important that intelligence be wary of preconceptions <sup>as evidenced by Pearl Harbor</sup> and it is thus necessary that intelligence activities be separated from policy formation and execution. An illustration of the disastrous results of having intelligence <sup>solely</sup> appraised by those who are responsible for policy formation <sup>in addition to the Pearl Harbor incident</sup> was seen in the case of our invasion of Africa, <sup>where Hitler who was given</sup> where Hitler who appraised the intelligence that we were going to land there and who was also responsible for policy formation and

execution, stated that it was impossible that we would do that because we did not have enough ships.

*the Central*  
Mr. Dulles feels that top control of ~~an~~ Intelligence Agency should be civilian, *the Chief* or that at least ~~it~~ should be completely separated from the military services. In other words, if intelligence is directed by a military person, he must have no command and must be completely divorced from *the incidents* ~~feelings~~ of military rank.

In recent years scientific intelligence has become extremely important. This represents a tremendous change in *requirements of* the ~~need for~~ intelligence agencies and makes the game much more difficult. Technicians are needed if scientific information is to be adequately obtained and evaluated.

How to get adequate men to do the job - both at home and abroad - is a difficult problem. The quality of the agents is more important than their numbers. A permanent and honorable career must be available to those engaging in this work. It has a certain glamor for the young and inexperienced but does not now appeal as a lifetime career. It might be possible to work out a certain amount of interchangeability between intelligence and foreign service. People in the field of intelligence have to keep their mouths shut and seek for their reward in life from the work that they do. They can receive little or no public acclaim since their work must be anonymous. The situation is a little better in the intelligence agencies of the military services but even there it has *been difficult to find* ~~not worked too well~~ *highly qualified men.*

Secret intelligence and secret operations must have unified control and this is a problem for the intelligence set-up to meet. Present legislation is broad enough to cover this point and it is probably best not to be too specific in statutes.

It is a debatable question whether the collector of intelligence should be responsible for processing and appraising it. On one hand it is felt that the processors should be separate in an ivory tower of their own to avoid the dangers of placing more stress and reliance upon what they or their close

associates have collected than on what has been collected by others. Thus, on this theory, collection should be separate from processing and appraising. On the other hand, it is sometimes felt that the rivalry between processors and collectors within CIA is just as strong as that between CIA and the intelligence agencies of the other services, and therefore, there is little point to a rigid separation of processing and appraising from collection. Mr. Dulles suggested that it might be possible to <sup>strengthen</sup> ~~change~~ the over-all top analysis <sup>of CIA</sup> by bringing into it <sup>responsible</sup> ~~top~~ people from the State Department and the military services.

In response to questions from Mr. Cowles, Mr. Dulles stated that CIA was just starting in on the problem of psychological warfare and propaganda. He stated that quite satisfactory relationships exist between CIA and the British on secret intelligence. ~~Other desirable aspects of intelligence are just beginning to develop.~~ It takes time to build an adequate intelligence service. *He can learn much from the British.*

In response to questions from Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Dulles stated that we should be careful to avoid duplication in over-all intelligence appraisal. Present appraisals are largely made by young and not very experienced persons. The present system of appraisal is quite unsatisfactory. There is no ideal solution but we must get something better than what we have at present.

In response to questions from Mr. Allen, Mr. Dulles stated that the

*He* CIA has a working relationship with the Atomic Energy Commission, ~~and that it did not know what its liaison was~~ ~~should develop one~~ with the Research and Development Board. CIA is maintaining contacts with universities on matters of personnel.

In response to questions from Mr. Knowlson, Mr. Dulles stated that possibly the Director of CIA should report directly to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, instead of to the whole National Security Council which is possibly too large for the purpose. <sup>Anyway, a Committee is not a good</sup> The question of the access of the Director of CIA to the President is also a debatable one - such contacts should

probably be through the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. In time of war CIA should probably be under the Secretary of Defense or JCS.

This is not true in time of peace because of the great dependency of CIA on the facilities of the State Department. It is better for CIA to be <sup>responsible to</sup> ~~headed by~~ one man than by a Committee, <sup>and the Secretary</sup> or to the Secretary of State or Defense. <sup>than to</sup> ~~be responsible to a Committee such as the NSC.~~

In response to questions from Mr. Ward, Mr. Dulles stated that he felt it would be undesirable to tie domestic propaganda into CIA; the latter should be concerned only with action relating to <sup>foreign countries</sup> ~~the enemy~~ - education of our own people is not a proper function of CIA. ~~The latter function should remain diffuse, although if possible coordinated to some extent by NSC. The human element in local propaganda and education is an extremely important one.~~

In response to questions from Mr. McCloy, Mr. Dulles stated that he ~~thinks~~ <sup>seems</sup> ~~that probably~~ the present organizational location of CIA is ~~probably best~~ <sup>as stated earlier,</sup> although it <sup>would</sup> ~~might~~ function more easily if it reported only to the Secretaries of State and Defense. The CIA has not yet built up sufficient prestige to get the full support of the intelligence agencies of the military services and the State Department. This is a matter of confidence and time. There is no serious open friction but ~~probably~~ a good deal of quiet ignoring of CIA.

In response to a question from Col. Truman-Smith, Mr. Dulles stated that one agency should control the handling and running of all the agents in a given area, although these agents do not necessarily have to be members of that agency.

In response to a question from General Embick, Mr. Dulles stated that liaison between CIA and FBI exists but that it must be worked out more satisfactorily. <sup>For this</sup> CIA needs more prestige. ~~It is a connection.~~

In response to questions from Mr. Eberstadt, Mr. Dulles stated that there is necessity for better relationships between the State Department and CIA in the foreign field and that lack of proper relationship is ~~probably simply~~ the result of growing pains. There is also need for ~~better~~ coordination of ~~central~~ <sup>secret</sup>

*secret*  
intelligence and ~~central~~ operations. The relations between CIA and JCS are satisfactory so far as Mr. Dulles knows.

In response to a question from Mr. Patterson, Mr. Dulles states that the intelligence agency in the State Department is now a separate entity from CIA and that it duplicates some of the functions of CIA. ~~They should be put together more effectively in some way.~~

*This duplication  
should be  
eliminated.*